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RENEWING OUR COMMITMENT TO THE
HIGHEST IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION*
HARRY T. EDWARDS**
The legal profession is suffering from an uneasy malaise-a
malaise caused, I believe, by the fact that too many lawyers have lost
sight of the highest ideals of our profession. In my view, members of
the legal academy, no less than members of the practicing bar, must
take responsibility for this problem and positive steps to cure it.
My conclusions are not based on rigorous empirical research,
but, rather, come from my forty years of experience in the profession,
including significant periods of time as a practicing lawyer in a major
law firm, an arbitrator, a law professor, and a judge. From this
vantage point, I will describe the problems I see and offer some
suggestions that may help to address some of the profession's ills.
REACHING FOR THE HIGHEST IDEALS OF OUR PROFESSION
I recently had an opportunity to think seriously about the state of
the profession when the Association of American Law Schools
invited me to participate in their conference on "Legal Ethics in a
New Millennium." The purpose of the conference was to consider
* Delivered as the inaugural Marilyn Yarbrough Memorial Lecture for the North
Carolina Law Review's Symposium, "Empirical Studies of the Legal Profession: What Do
We Know About Lawyers' Lives?" at the University of North Carolina School of Law,
October 28, 2005.
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1962; J.D., Michigan 1965; Adjunct Professor of Law, NYU Law School. Judge Edwards
was a faculty member at the University of Michigan Law School from 1970 to 1975 and
from 1977 to 1980, and at Harvard Law School from 1975 to 1977, earning tenure at both
schools. He was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in
1980, where he served as Chief Judge from October 1994 until July 2001. During the past
twenty-five years, he has continued to teach part-time, serving as an Adjunct Professor of
Law at Michigan, Pennsylvania, Duke, Georgetown, Harvard, and NYU, where he has
taught for the past fifteen years.
1. Mid-Year Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Workshop on
"Legal Ethics in a New Millennium: New Practice, New Rules, New Visions," June 12-14,
2005, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. For more information on this meeting, see Legal Ethics
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whether changes in American society and world affairs threaten
settled ways of life in the legal profession. The principal premise of
the conference appeared to be that global, economic, technological,
and demographic changes will require a reassessment of the
fundamental values of the legal profession. I rejected this premise
then and reject it now. What I believe is not that the highest ideals of
our profession need to be reassessed, but, rather, that we need to
renew our commitment to those ideals. I also believe that we need to
commit ourselves to passing these ideals to the generation of young
lawyers who are now most seriously encumbered by the profession's
malaise.
It is indisputable that we have witnessed profound changes in the
profession during the last half century. Technology has transformed
the way lawyers work and interact with their clients, the courts, and
one another.2 Law schools offer more courses in international and
comparative law,3 and more lawyers now practice in international
arenas.4 There are many more truly large law firms and many more
incredibly wealthy lawyers in society.' Law practice, especially in our
largest cities, is highly competitive, and lawyers often think little of
changing firms to advance their practice opportunities and enhance
their economic wealth. There are more women and people of color in
the profession.6  And the public is more aware of how lawyers
practice, legislators operate, and courts decide cases, due to extensive
media coverage, Internet blogging, and television programs like
"Court TV."
In my view, however, these and other global, economic,
technological, and demographic changes should neither determine
nor even affect the fundamental values of the legal profession. I
believe that "fundamental values" are founded on the highest ideals
of our profession, and that they inspire lawyers to serve their clients
and the public good and to understand that these commitments are
2. See generally Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable
Thoughts, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 305 (2000).
3. See John A. Barrett, Jr., International Legal Education in U.S. Law Schools:
Plenty of Offerings, but Too Few Students, 31 INT'L LAW. 845, 852-53 (1997).
4. See Scott S. Brinkmeyer, Lest We Forget, MICH. B.J., Mar. 2004, at 11, 12.
5. See EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS ET AL., FROM PAPER CHASE TO MONEY CHASE:
LAW SCHOOL DEBT DIVERTS THE ROAD TO PUBLIC SERVICE 14 (2002), available at
http://www.napil.org/publications; Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 3, 36-37 (2004); see also Harry T. Edwards, Speech: A New Vision for the Legal
Profession, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 567,570 (1997).
6. See AM. BAR ASS'N, J.D. ENROLLMENT STATISTICS, http://www.abanet.org/legal
ed/statistics/jd.html (last modified Apr. 5, 2005).
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not mutually exclusive. The rules governing the behavior of lawyers
come from a variety of sources-our federal and state constitutions,
statutes, procedural and evidentiary rules, the common law, court
rules, and, most importantly, various codes of ethics and the cases
construing them. Taken together, the rules from these traditional
sources roughly codify the fundamental values of the profession. But
these codified rules do not fully capture what Professor Stephen
Gillers calls "the idea[l] of professionalism."7  This ideal has no
precise boundaries, but it is premised on the view that "a professional
subordinates self-interest and private gain to the interests of clients
and the public good generally."8  It is my belief that truly great
lawyers far exceed what the codes of conduct require, reaching
instead for the highest ideals of our profession-the ideals from which
our fundamental values are derived. I will try to amplify these views.
THE FUNDAMENTAL VALUES OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
My starting point is quite simple: Law schools are professional
schools, not graduate schools. We grant JDs, not Ph.Ds. Upon
graduation, our students are qualified to seek licenses that normally
are not available to persons Who do not have a legal education.
Therefore, the public has a right to assume that lawyers have attained
a certain level of technical competence, share a commitment to a
defined set of ethical norms, and accept the responsibility to interpret
and practice the law in public-regarding ways.9
The tools that lawyers use to perform their work have changed
over time; lawyers' clients and the nature of their problems have
changed; and the laws that attorneys must interpret and apply have
changed. But the basic responsibilities of lawyers have not changed.
The principal work of most lawyers is to find, interpret, and apply the
law on behalf of clients. In pursuing this work, lawyers counsel their
clients on how to comply with the law; draft contracts and other
documents that establish benefits for their clients and protect their
interests; and represent their clients in courts and other tribunals that
adjudicate the rights of parties. Some lawyers teach the law; some
enforce the law; some legislate; and some judge. But the principal
mission of most lawyers is to represent clients' interests within the
bounds of the law.
7. STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
ETHICS 1 (6th ed. 2002).
8. Id. at 12.
9. Harry T. Edwards, Another "Postscript" to "The Growing Disjunction Between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession," 69 WASH. L. REV. 561, 563-64 (1994).
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It may be more difficult now than it was fifty years ago for
lawyers to find, interpret, and apply the law, because there is so much
more law emanating from so many more state, federal, and
international regulatory agencies, legislative bodies, and courts. Big
corporate clients, many of whom have global interests, generate
problems that are entirely different from and more complicated than
those handled by lawyers even a decade ago. Criminal lawyers must
now understand the science of DNA evidence. Administrative
lawyers must understand the economics of regulatory regimes and the
changing science and technology that underpins their substantive area
of expertise. And the business side of law practice-including the
notorious billable-hours mania; fierce competition for clients; difficult
conflicts problems; internal management issues that are a by-product
of complicated firm bureaucracies, far-flung branch offices, and
mergers; and personnel turnover due to departures by young
associates and resignations by partners who find better arrangements
with competing firms-has no resemblance to the law firm life that I
knew forty years ago when I was an associate with a "big firm" of
thirty lawyers.
I could go on with countless additional examples of "change" in
the legal profession, but to no good end. The point that I want to
make is that these global, economic, technological, and demographic
changes have not altered the basic responsibilities of lawyers-the
principal mission of most lawyers continues to be the representation
of clients' interests within the bounds of the law. This was true well
before the birth of our nation and it is true now.
If lawyers' basic responsibilities have not changed over the
centuries, one might wonder whether the same has been true with
respect to lawyers' codes of conduct. Professor Carol Rice Andrews
considered this question in a recently published article entitled
Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution."0
Professor Andrews found that, over the past 800 years, the core
duties underpinning the ethical codes for lawyers in Great Britain,
France, and the United States have remained "surprisingly
constant.""
The statement of ethics standards has evolved in subject matter,
detail, and degree of enforcement, but the central elements of a
lawyer's professional duty have remained substantially
10. Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution,
57 SMU L. REV. 1385 (2004).
11. Id. at 1386.
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unchanged. Lawyers have long had the core duties of fairness
in litigation, competence, loyalty, confidentiality,
reasonableness in fees, and public service. The continuation of
these standards suggests certain inherent characteristics of
lawyers and society's reaction to them. The changes in basic
subject matter tell us how the practice of law itself has evolved.
The addition of detail in the statement of the core standards
reveals uncertainty and division as to the underlying core
duties. The added detail also reflects an increased regulatory
environment, but the official statements of standards over time
have been both regulatory, in reaction to specific abuses, and
aspirational to inspire lawyers in their calling. This suggests
that actual lawyer behavior typically falls between the two
extremes. Finally, the 800-year tradition of the core standards
suggests something far more fundamental: that lawyers always
have played an important role in society and that society
demands integrity in that role.12
Professor Andrews' study suggests that the traditional core duties
underlying the rules governing the behavior of lawyers will continue
to provide a foundation for our codes of ethics in the foreseeable
future, regardless of global, economic, technological, and
demographic changes in society. The published rules governing the
behavior of lawyers will change to take account of the changing
details of how we practice law. But as long as the principal mission of
lawyers is to represent clients, the core duties of the profession are
unlikely to change.
THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PRACTICING LAWYERS
As noted above, I believe that, even though the published rules
governing the behavior of lawyers roughly codify the fundamental
values of the profession, truly great lawyers far exceed what the codes
of conduct require. In other words, in my view, the highest ideals of
our profession include more than the codified rules require. There is
no doubt that the "core duties" of a lawyer identified by Professor
Andrews emanate from our highest ideals. It is also clear that these
core duties underpin our codes of ethics. The legislative process,
however, rarely leaves grand ideas intact, so, unsurprisingly, the
highest ideals of the legal profession invariably are diluted in the
process of codification. The result is that, although the published
12. Id. at 1388-89.
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rules governing the behavior of lawyers seek to incorporate and
fortify our highest ideals, they necessarily fall short. Great lawyers
recognize this and always look beyond the published rules in striving
to reach our highest ideals. They aim to give content to the grand but
illusive "ideal of professionalism," which inspires them to serve their
clients and the public good and to understand that these
commitments are not mutually exclusive.
In an article published sixteen years ago,13 I argued that lawyers
have a duty to conform their practice to our highest ideals-what I
then called the profession's "public spiritedness."'14 In advancing a
standard of "public spiritedness," it is my view that, as a part of their
professional role, lawyers are obliged to serve the public good. 5 It is
this standard of public spiritedness that embodies the "highest ideals"
of the legal profession.
Justice Brandeis said that a lawyer who ascribes to these highest
ideals is the "people's lawyer."" Brandeis emphasized how the
profession's "happy combination of the intellectual with the practical
life" makes lawyers uniquely fit to facilitate public and private
transactions of all kinds; hence the indispensability of attorneys to the
business world. 7 But precisely because the lawyer's special skills
make him or her indispensable in conducting social affairs generally,
the lawyer could not, in Brandeis' view, legitimately represent only
the interests of business. Instead, Brandeis argued, a lawyer must
both participate in the political process and aim to influence private
clients to view their interests in ways that are consistent with the
public good. 8
Lawyers who profess a professional obligation to employ means
to achieve ends "which as citizens they could not approve," Brandeis
wrote, "justify themselves by a false analogy. They have erroneously
assumed that the rule of ethics to be applied to a lawyer's advocacy is
the same where he acts for private interests against the public, as it is
in litigation between private individuals."' 9  Unlike a party in a
lawsuit, Brandeis noted, "the public is often inadequately represented
or wholly unrepresented" when matters of social importance are
13. See Harry T. Edwards, A Lawyer's Duty To Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1148 (1990).
14. Id. at 1150.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1155 (quoting Louis Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law, Address Before
the Harvard Ethical Society (May 4, 1905), in BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 313, 321 (1914)).
17. Id. (quoting Louis Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461,469 (1916)).
18. Id. at 1155-56 (citing Brandeis, supra note 16, at 321-23).
19. Id. at 1156 (quoting Brandeis, supra note 16, at 323).
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decided in corporate boardrooms and legislative chambers.2 ° Thus,
consistent with our ethical standards, lawyers must take account of
the public interest even when working within the realm of their
private representations21
Great lawyers are measured by intangible qualities-qualities
that cannot be achieved by merely honing one's conduct to the
regulatory or even the aspirational standards of our codes of ethics.
Great lawyers care about law in the sense that they have a strong
intellectual interest in it; they care about the well-being of their
clients; they care about their own image as professionals; and they
take the time to mentor younger members of the profession so that
they will understand and embrace "the ideal of professionalism."
Great lawyers have a sense of their professional self that leads them
to internalize and update good standards of behavior, that reinforces
pride in their work, and that pushes them routinely to provide high-
quality services. A great lawyer does not view the "law" solely in
instrumental and market terms as the outcome of aggressive
assertions by opposing forces in courts, legislatures, and other
institutions. Neither does the great lawyer consider "justice" to be
largely subsumed within whatever our pluralistic system comes up
with as a modern definition of the term. Rather, great lawyers seek
to serve their clients and the public good, and these commitments are
not seen as mutually exclusive. Great lawyers always aim to reach the
highest ideals of our profession.
In recent years, this noble view of our profession has been
tarnished. Corporate scandals have caused the public to denounce
some members of the legal profession for their perceived failures in
the face of fraud committed by executives of their corporate clients.
Lawyers have even been accused of criminal and unethical conduct,
including encouraging or allowing clients to destroy documents,
abetting fraud, and conducting investigations in the face of conflicts
of interest. Many attorneys believe they are immune from criminal or
civil liability when they ignore signs that people in control of a client
corporation are committing fraud. The current legal and ethical rules
are controversial, so I will not venture into those thickets. The courts
will determine, in due course, whether, and to what extent, attorneys
are culpable in these situations.
I will say, however, that I do not accept the suggestion that a
lawyer necessarily avoids culpability in the face of misdeeds so long as
20. Id. (quoting Brandeis, supra note 16, at 324).
21. Id.
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she or he acts within the bounds of our codes of conduct. I have
found that, in most cases, if a lawyer is disdainful of corrupt practices
and counsels clients to eschew such practices, the clients will follow
the lawyer's advice. I suspect that some of the problems that we have
seen in recent years have arisen because some lawyers, in their
pursuit of billable hours, assume that they may lose clients if they
press to achieve morally just practices. If my suspicions are correct,
this would be a truly dismaying situation.
A lawyer is a "counselor." This means that lawyers are obliged
to explain to clients how their interests may be pursued or protected
within the bounds of the law and the public good. A lawyer should
not "look away" when a client seeks to pursue lawful goals through
perverse means, or to achieve unlawful goals through lawful means.
Good lawyers counsel against such behavior, and they do not need a
code book to explain to clients the difference between right and
wrong. If lawyers did more counseling of this sort, we would not need
to debate whether lawyers must take meaningful steps to stop a
client's ongoing fraud, whether attorneys have a duty to third parties
to correct their client's misrepresentations, or whether attorneys have
a duty to disclose problematic behavior occurring higher up the
corporate hierarchy. Lawyers who counsel their clients on good
behavior from the outset will destroy many of the seeds of corruption
that have caused both lawyers and their corporate clients to be
brought before the courts in recent years to account for their alleged
misdeeds.
As Sol Linowitz argues in his book, The Betrayed Profession:
The essence of the claim to professional status and professional
privilege is that the members of the profession hold themselves
to higher standards than other people.... A lawyer ... is
supposed to be ethical, even when he [or she] could make more
money by being unethical.... What makes the lawyer
professional is his insistence that in the legal realm he sets the
parameters of what he will and will not do.2"
I think it is clear that lawyers have an obligation to promote legally
and morally just behavior, and to teach young members of the
profession to do the same. But the highest ideals of our profession
require even more. We must also initiate action on behalf of those in
need. Over the past quarter century, there has been a decline in
22. SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION:
LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 229 (1994).
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federal support of the Legal Services Corporation, which funds local
programs to provide civil legal services to poor people, and which
remains the primary source of funding for such services. Adjusted for
inflation, federal appropriations for the Legal Services Corporation
are about half what they were in 1980.23 Perhaps not surprisingly,
Legal Services offices can no longer meet the Corporation's goal of
providing two lawyers for every 10,000 people living below the
poverty line.24 Our failure to meet even this very modest goal poses a
serious problem if we believe that lawyers have a duty to promote
access to justice for all.
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that young lawyers face
significant financial disincentives weighing against careers in public
interest and government practice. The cost of going to law school has
soared. For example, between 1987 and 1997, law school tuition more
than doubled.25 And, there has been a tenfold increase in the gap
between starting salaries in public interest and corporate law firm
jobs since the 1970s.26
We must take steps to fill the gap in the provision of legal
services to less affluent members of our society. We must also
support young lawyers who are inclined to pursue careers in public
interest and government practice. Established private practitioners
should contribute resources to ensure that all members of the public
have access to legal services. Fortunately, many law firms do take this
professional obligation seriously. However, despite the substantial
pro bono work performed by many firms, our drive to provide legal
services to all in need has fallen dismally short. The number of
people, both poor and middle class, without access to the legal system
remains intolerably high.27
In short, when students graduate from law schools, they should
have more than a good understanding of the ethical standards of our
profession. They should also have a clear sense of our highest ideals.
23. Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 369, 379-80 (2004).
24. See LEGAL SERVICES CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 2003-04 18, available at
www.Isc.gov/about/pdfs/AnnualReport2003-2004.pdf; Michael A. Mogill, Professing Pro
Bono: To Walk the Talk, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 5, 12 (2001).
25. Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 719, 738 & n.67 (2001).
26. Id. at 739.
27. LEGAL SERVICES CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 5 (2005)
(concluding that at least eighty percent of the civil legal needs of low-income Americans
are not being met).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Young graduates who choose highly remunerative private practice
should be prepared to serve the public good, whether through
assisting in the establishment of pro bono programs; volunteering
their time to public interest groups; contributing money to worthy
causes; running for public office; working on important bar
association projects; speaking and writing in support of public interest
endeavors; or tutoring inner-city youths who are the victims of a poor
education in some of our disastrous public school systems. Law
schools should help law students to understand these commitments
and cherish the opportunities they present, so that law graduates are
inspired to serve the public good following graduation.
THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LEGAL ACADEMY
I have heard many law professors say that the legal academy
cannot be blamed for the shortcomings of practicing lawyers. This is
a dangerous attitude, because I do not believe that the profession's
malaise can be cured if members of the legal academy turn a blind
eye to the problems that we are now facing.
In constructing a vision of legal education, I agree with Professor
J.B. White, who has written that, in order for legal academic work "to
be of value to the law it is essential that the work in question express
interest in, and respect for, the possibilities of what lawyers ... do."28
Unfortunately, in my view, too many legal academics do not produce
such work. Why? Because they seem to forget that law schools are
professional schools, not graduate schools, so they have little interest
in the work of practitioners. Indeed, there are still a number of law
professors who express outright disdain for the practice of law.
In a recent article entitled The Dangers of the Ivory Tower: The
Obligation of Law Professors To Engage in the Practice of Law,29
Professor Amy B. Cohen lamented the fact that too many law
professors are simply clueless when it comes to assessing the
challenges, burdens, and rewards of law practice:
The intellectual effort and energy that practicing attorneys
expend is inspiring. Law professors tend to forget, I believe,
that the practice of law is as much an intellectual pursuit as is
the teaching of law. Our students do not forget what we teach
them; they use those skills to solve the problems of real clients
while under the tremendous stresses of maintaining client
28. James Boyd White, Law Teachers' Writing, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1970, 1976 (1993).
29. Amy B. Cohen, The Dangers of the Ivory Tower: The Obligation of Law
Professors To Engage in the Practice of Law, 50 LoY. L. REV. 623 (2004).
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relationships, conducting themselves ethically, and often finding
themselves on the losing side of an issue with a client who does
not want to hear that opinion. A law professor has the luxury
of taking a position on an issue without worries about losing a
client or not getting paid for time spent researching an issue to
its depth; a practicing lawyer does not have that luxury and
thus, in some ways, must be more creative, more resourceful,
and more realistic in addressing legal questions.
Every law professor should at some time during his or her
teaching career be forced to confront that reality, not only
because it will make that professor a better teacher and a better
scholar, but also a better, less cynical, more humble and
appreciative representative of our profession-the one we share
with the lawyers we have all educated and sent out to the world
of practice.30
In pressing the point that law schools are professional schools, not
graduate schools, I do not mean to suggest that law schools are or
should be "trade schools." Our law schools must nurture thoughtful
lawyers who have first-rate legal minds and an understanding of and
commitment to the broader public responsibilities that are at the
heart of the profession. This requires law professors who are able to
address large questions of theory and policy, using modes of research
and analysis that extend beyond the lines of inquiry common to the
study of legal doctrine. Legal education must therefore include
significant elements of interdisciplinary study. Many law schools now
attract faculty members who are well-versed in disciplines such as
economics, political science, and sociology. We still face the problem,
however, that too many legal scholars address material from other
disciplines without situating it in a legal context.
31
I am also distressed that, in recent years, a number of law schools
have adopted hiring policies that require teaching candidates to have
published major articles before seeking employment in the legal
academy.32 These policies baffle me, for they preclude many bright
young law graduates who prefer to focus on practice for a few years
from subsequently entering the teaching profession. This means that
the pool of talented law professors with even a serious taste of
30. Id. at 644.
31. Harry T. Edwards, Reflections (On Law Review, Legal Education, Law Practice,
and My Alma Mater), 100 MICH. L. REV. 1999, 2002 (2002).
32. Id. at 2005.
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practice experience is greatly diminished and the gulf between legal
education and the practice of law remains too wide.
This problem is not solved by law school fellowship programs
that allow individuals interested in law teaching to spend a year
writing a major article.33 In part because of the relatively small
stipends they provide, these fellowships primarily attract recent
graduates wishing to enter the teaching market. Most have little or
no practice experience. And a lawyer who has achieved any real
practice experience is not likely to accept a $25,000 fellowship to
write a law review article that might offer the opportunity of a law
teaching position, especially if he or she has acquired any of the
obligations of adulthood that almost inevitably come within the half
dozen years that it takes to achieve any status as a practitioner.
Nor does the hiring of adjunct professors solve the problem.
Although adjunct professors undoubtedly make important
contributions to the academy, their roles are limited. Adjunct
professors do not have full status as faculty members, which means
that they have no real say over student admissions, faculty hiring, or
curriculum. And they do not participate in the day-to-day life of a
law school, during which faculty members exchange ideas and engage
in both serious conversations and fruitful banter during colloquia,
luncheons, and faculty meetings. Law schools need scholars and
teachers who have real practice experience engaged in these
dialogues.
If law schools are serious about recruiting individuals with
significant practice experience to fill faculty positions, they must
supplement writing fellowship programs and adjunct professorships
with other alternatives. One possibility would be to create more
visiting professorships for truly talented practitioners who have a real
interest in the academy.34 This would allow a bright lawyer with
substantial practice experience to join a law faculty community,
devote all of his or her time to teaching and writing, and earn a
reasonable salary. Visiting professors would have an opportunity to
33. See, e.g., Harvard Law School, The Houston and Lewis Fellowships 2006-2007,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/fellowships/law-teaching-lewis.php (last visited
Apr. 20, 2006) (describing two $25,000 fellowships offered by Harvard Law School to
"promising candidates for law teaching who have evidenced strong interest in scholarship
and teaching").
34. See, e.g., Northwestern University School of Law, Visiting Assistant Professor
Program, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/recruitment/visitingassistant.html (last
visited Apr. 20, 2006) (requiring an advanced legal degree or "substantial practical
experience" in relevant fields of law before becoming eligible for the program).
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prove themselves as teachers and scholars and, if they are successful,
ultimately gain tenure.35
Unless law schools ensure that their faculties reflect a real
balance of talent-i.e., including professors with strengths in both
"impractical" and "practical" scholarship and teaching36 -the current
gulf between the profession and the academy will continue to grow
and become even more distressing. During the past twenty-five years,
many of my former law clerks have complained that their legal
educations did not give them good measures of practice. And
countless young lawyers are disenchanted with practice in large law
firms. Many see these firms only as money-making enterprises-
involving unreasonable hours, tedious work, sometimes questionable
ethical decisions, and little commitment to our highest ideals beyond
the codified rules governing the behavior of lawyers. Large numbers
of graduates still seek jobs in the major firms, for the employment
benefits are good and the high salaries help to pay off school debts.
All too frequently, however, some of the brightest young attorneys
leave law practice to join the legal academy as quickly as possible,
with little practical knowledge and insignificant professional
experience.37 Once they "escape" to the academy, many of these
young faculty members have little interest in addressing the problems
they saw in law practice. This results in a great loss to the profession.
Why? Because it is difficult for law professors who know little about
the legal profession to truly inspire law students to serve the public
good upon graduation.
In preparing her article, Professor Cohen conducted a small
survey among practitioners. The most frequently selected answer to
the Practitioner Survey question, "What skills did you find yourself
least prepared for when you began your practice?," was "Ethical
Issues."38 Professor Cohen suggests that law schools fail to prepare
35. See, for example, the faculty profile of Professor James B. Speta, an Associate
Professor at Northwestern University School of Law, James B. Speta, Professor of Law,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/fulltime/Speta/Speta.html (last visited Apr. 20,
2006). After a judicial clerkship in my chambers, Professor Speta, a 1991 graduate of the
University of Michigan Law School, practiced appellate, telecommunications, and
antitrust law with a major Chicago law firm. He joined the Northwestern Law School
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students adequately for the ethical dilemmas that they will face in
practice, because so many law professors are openly disdainful of
practice. This disdain, once conveyed to students, contributes to the
cynicism of new attorneys towards practice and thus to some of the
ethical problems facing the profession.39 Professor Cohen asks the
right questions:
[I]f law faculty have a negative view of the profession, should
they not hold themselves responsible since they are the ones
training these individuals for the practice of law? If lawyers are
crass and unethical, who better than their teachers to teach
them to be otherwise?... Unfortunately, if law professors
continue to distance themselves from practice, they cannot
teach students to be better, more ethical lawyers because they
are not themselves informed about the world of practice.4"
The questions raised by Professor Cohen are terribly important,
because the price that we are paying for continued dissonance
between legal education and the practice of law is too high. In a
recent article in the Harvard Law Review, Professor David Wilkins
notes:
If the financial scandals of the first few years of the twenty-first
century have taught us anything, it is that a world in which
professionals are encouraged to bleach themselves of every
commitment save the ruthless pursuit of profit is a prescription
for disaster of near-biblical proportions. It will take much more
... than moral exhortation to [cure the ills of law practice]. [We
need] a normative commitment to seeing the crucial role that
... lawyers play in the structure of our economic system.
41
I would disagree with Professor Wilkins in only one respect. I would
change the words "normative commitment" to "renewed
commitment."
CONCLUSION
The fundamental values of our legal profession are clear and
have persisted, unchanged, for centuries. What we need is a renewed
commitment to those values and the highest ideals from which they
39. See id. at 633.
40. Id. at 633-34.
41. David B. Wilkins, The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of
the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1614 (2004).
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are derived. We need legal academics who accept Professor White's
premise that, in order for legal academic work to be of value, law
professors must express interest in, and respect for, the possibilities of
what lawyers do. We need law schools fully committed to hiring
bright lawyers who have significant practice experience and who have
the potential to become serious scholars and teachers. In other
words, we need law schools to achieve and maintain a reasonable
balance in their faculty hiring so that bright practitioners are not
excluded from the academy. And we need members of the bar who
understand and promote Justice Brandeis's conception of the
"people's lawyer." If we can meet these commitments, we will see
more truly great lawyers who far exceed what the rules of ethics
require and who always aim to reach the highest ideals of our
profession. And our society will be the better for it.
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